After the Meese & Rogoff 1983-results, researchers have searched with torch for macroeconomic variables with predictive power on horizons shorter than 6 months. Recently, several papers have showed that order flows influence exchange rates intradaily. Maybe order flow may be of importance also for lower frequencies than intraday, like the weekly frequency? In this paper I test a trading model where order flow may be informative due to the existence of private information, and where there are important macroeconomic public information as well. Using weekly data for spot and options trading in the U.S., the model is tested for five exchange rates against US Dollar. For three of the exchange rates, DEM/USD, GBP/USD and CHF/USD, I find that order flow is an important variable for explaining weekly changes in exchange rates. The coefficients are both statistically and economically significant, and have intuitive sign. When U.S banks sell foreign currency, the foreign currency depreciates.
Introduction
In the last couple of years several papers have found that order flow is an important determinant of exchange rates. Lyons (1995) , Yao (1998) and Bjønnes and Rime (2000b) have studied dealer response to order flow intra day, Evans (1998) and Payne (1999) have studied the importance of intra day order flow on the whole market, while Evans and Lyons (1999) have studied the impact of daily order flow and Rime (2000) for weekly order flow. Drawing on the theory of financial markets' microstructure, the authors have concluded that there exist private information in the foreign exchange market, and that order flow aggregates this information into prices.
The significance of these results becomes apparent when contrasted to the kind of result that we have been used to in exchange rate economics (e.g. Meese and Rogoff, 1983a,b) . Typically, the traditional macroeconomic models receive low support at the biannual frequency, and almost no support at the monthly frequency.
There may be several reasons for the lack of empirical support for the macroeconomic models. A questionnaire study of London-based foreign exchange analysts by Allen and Taylor (1989) showed considerable heterogeneity of expectations. Several recent survey studies confirm the view of agent heterogeneity. 1 The data in Bjønnes and Rime (2000a) reveal that dealers expect other dealers to have different information than themselves.
Furthermore, in the traditional macroeconomic models exchange rates are determined by public macroeconomic information, while trading activities are completely irrelevant. As an example, consider the effect of trading in the traditional flexible price monetary model, one of the traditional models. In this model, the exchange rate is determined by public information about the relative size of monetary aggregates and of the aggregate economics. Thus, trading as such has no effect on prices, since all available information will be aggregated into prices prior to trading. Trading will only occur to the extent that dealers require exchange for known reasons, e.g. trade in goods or liquidity needs. This kind of trade will have no effect on exchange rates, since the trading does not reveal any new information by assumption.
However, the huge trading volume of foreign exchange markets seems to be an important characteristic that one should try to take account of and build into models. Judging from the intra-day and survey evidence mentioned above, it might be that ignoring the possible existence of private information is the main shortcoming of the macroeconomic models for addressing shorter horizons. Maybe one should consider order flows as relevant variables also at lower frequencies, together with macroeconomic variables?
In this paper, I test a model for determining exchange rates that includes both public and private information variables on the weekly horizon. The model, based on a model by Evans and Lyons (1999) , integrates public macroeconomic information in a microstructural trading model where the order flow aggregates private information. The model is tested for five exchange rates on four years of weekly data, from the beginning of July 1995 until the end of September 1999. The exchange rates are US dollar (USD) against the Deutsche mark (DEM), Japanese yen (JPY), pound sterling (GBP), Canadian dollar (CAD) and Swiss franc (CHF). The key to this kind of analysis is a recent data set on weekly trading activity from the U.S market. The models receive considerable support, with significant effects from order flow.
In the theory of market microstructure of financial markets, one seeks to relax the assumptions of the traditional macroeconomic models: perfect information, homogeneous agents, and that the institutions for trading are non-consequential. Trading then becomes an important determinant of asset prices. Since the existence of private information results in trading when there are gains from trade, trading as such can be informative. Gains from trade may arise due to differentially motivated traders (like noise traders), and from dealers with different needs or attitudes towards risk. In markets with less than perfect transparency (observability), these different gains can not be separated from each other, and the flow may therefore contain some informative trade.
The foreign exchange market is characterized, among other things, by low transparency. Most of the trading in the foreign exchange market is not observed by all the participants. Dealers claim that there exist private information in the market, and that trading with customers is the most important source of private information (see Lyons, 1995; Yao, 1998; Bjønnes and Rime, 2000a; Rime, 2000) . Only the dealers in the specific bank observe the trades with customers. Within the interbank market, the dealers observe only a subset of the brokerage trades in addition to their own trades.
How do we expect that order flow should influence exchange rates? Consider the models of Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) . The price-setters, i.e. Market Makers, face other dealers that might have private information. When trading with potentially better informed players, the Market Makers adjust their beliefs about the uncertain asset value. In case of a buy order, they increase their expectations of the asset's value, and reduce it in case of a sell order. Effects of private information will therefore be related to an effect of currency trading on spot exchange rates.
This study utilizes a recent data set on currency trading by the "major players" in the U.S. currency market, collected by the U.S. Treasury. I have weekly observations from July of 1995 until September of 1999 on the volume of purchases and sales of spot transactions and changes in options positions. As far as I know there are only three similar studies on foreign exchange markets. Wei and Kim (1997) were the first to use the present data set. Their approach was very different from the present, and they found no evidence that trading was informative about exchange rate changes. This paper is very close in spirit to Evans and Lyons (1999) and Rime (2000) . Evans and Lyons (1999) develop a version of the model used in this paper and test it on daily data created from the real-time trading observations of Evans (1998) . They find that order flow is more significant than the change in interest differentials.
The advantage of the data set in this paper is that it covers four years of observations on the volume of trade. The series of Evans and Lyons (1999) cover observations for 79 days in 1996, and only on the net number of buy and sell orders and not the volume. The data in Rime (2000) are very similar to the present data set, with 3 years of weekly observations on aggregate currency trading by Norwegian banks. The trading observations are disaggregated on the three groups Foreigners, Norwegian Customers, and the Central Bank. Rime finds similar results as Evans and Lyons. Furthermore, the strongest effect is from the trading with customers, in line with the statements of dealers that customer trades are important private information.
The results in the present study are consistent with the results of Evans and Lyons. For DEM/USD, GBP/USD and CHF/USD order flow has a strong effect on price changes. A sale of foreign currency by U.S banks lead to a appreciation of the USD. This is consistent with an interpretation that U.S banks act as aggressors (take initiative to trade) when they have good information, which is possible because U.S banks do most of their trading while the European market is active. What might be most surprising is the fact that order flow has an effect over a week, implying that order flow analysis is useful also for longer horizons than the usual intra day and daily horizon that is most often considered. The results are however in accordance with the results of Evans (1999) and Rime (2000) .
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The model is presented in section 2. Section 3 presents the data. Results are presented and discussed in section 4, while section 5 concludes.
Model
The model, based on a model by Evans and Lyons (1999) , captures important aspects of the foreign exchange market. Customer trading, which is the basic source of demand in foreign exchange, triggers interdealer trading. During interdealer trading, dealers square their positions after the customer trade, and take a speculative position based on their private information from their customer trade. The following order flow from the interdealer trading leads to aggregation of information from the customer trades into prices. At the end of the day or week, most dealers want to go home with a zero position. Hence, the aggregate initial customer trading, interpreted as a portfolio shift, must be absorbed by the public after the interdealer trading. To be willing to absorb this, the public must be compensated by a risk premium, and the dealers speculate on its size during the interdealer trading. In addition, the initial portfolio shift by the customers may signal information on future currency return. In the model, the dealers will also speculate on basis of this signal and thus, aggregate order flow will be the variable signaling this private information to the rest of the market.
Consider an exchange economy with two assets, one risk free and one risky asset represented by a currency. 2 There are N dealers, and a public sector (customers) that is distributed in the continuous interval [0, 1] , so customers are more numerous than dealers and hence have a greater capacity for bearing risk (as a group). The horizon is infinite and timing within a period of the model is shown in figure 1 . The information of each group will be clear from the below description of the timing. Dealers decide on prices in each round, P i1,t , P i2,t and P i3,t , and the interdealer trade that takes place in round two, T i2,t , while the public decide their demand in round three, c 3,t . The public trade in round 1 is stochastic (see below).
Both quoting and interbank trading must follow some rules. The following rules govern the quoting of prices, P (see Lyons, 1997): P1. Quotes are given simultaneously, independently, and are required.
P2. All quotes are observable and available to all participants.
P3. Each quote is a single price at which the dealer agrees to buy and sell any amount.
Rule P1 ensures that prices cannot be conditioned on other dealers' prices, and that dealers cannot choose not to give quotes. When trades are initiated electronically in a multiple dealer market, this can potentially lead to simultaneous quotes and trades. Quoting and trading in the foreign exchange market is also extremely fast. Finally, not quoting would be a breach of the social norms for a Market Maker, and could be punished by other dealers. 3 Rule P2 states that there is costless search for quotes, which is true in the interbank market for normal trade sizes traded through the electronic broker systems. Through the different trading systems dealers can observe several quotes, making transparency of price very high. The foreign exchange market is extremely liquid with quotes and spread constant up to 10 mill USD, making rule P3 less restrictive than what might first be considered the case.
The following rules govern the interbank trading T i2,t of the dealers:
T1. Trading is simultaneous and independent T2. Trading with multiple partners is feasible T3. Trades are divided equally among dealers with the same quote, if someone wants to trade at the quote. 4
T4. All dealers must end the period with a zero inventory of currency.
Rule T1, that trading is simultaneous and independent, implies that trades received from other dealers, T it , is an unavoidable disturbance to dealer i's inventory. This is in 2 The appendix contains a more detailed exposition of the solution of the model. 3 The survey by Cheung and Chinn (1999b) shows that the "norms" of the market are considered important. Examples of punishment might be not receiving trades from other dealers, and only obtaining wide spreads.
4 When several dealers quote the same price, the volume at this price must be divided between the dealers. Such a split can be arranged in the following way: Dealers are placed in a circle. If several dealers quote the same price, dealer i trades with the next dealer to the left to i. Public trades c i1,t rt is the new public information on currency return arriving in the market in period t, Pτ,t is the price that the dealers give in trading round τ of period t, and c i1,t and c 3,t are the public's trading at the prices in round 1 and 3. In round 2, dealer i trades T i2,t at other dealers' price, and receive a net of T it from other dealers. After trading in round 2, the net aggregate order flow xt is revealed.
Before any trading takes place in period t, all agents observe the public information r t , which is the period t increment to the fundamental value of the currency,
The increments to currency value, r t , are IID 0, σ 2 r and r 1 is known. After observing the public information, dealers give quotes P i1,t to the public (i.e. the customers) who place their orders c i1,t . This trading is modeled as exogenous shocks and these are considered as portfolio shifts on behalf of the public. In Evans and Lyons, these shocks are IID 0, σ 2 c and hence not related to currency value. Here, I consider the case when this trading is a signal on the increment to the next period's fundamental value,
where η it ∼ IID 0, σ 2 c . The trading with customers in round 1 is only observable to the dealers involved in the trade, so that customer trades are private information to the dealers involved. Since trading in round 1 is stochastic, the public should be considered as divided into two groups, with one group trading in round 1 and the other in round 3. Each customer in round 1 is small, and does not regard his own trading in round 1 as informative about overall trading in round 3. The public will not speculate in round 3 prices based on their own round 1 trading.
In round 2, all dealers simultaneously give interbank trading quotes, and then trade with each other to get rid of the inventory risk associated with round 1 trading. In addition, they speculate on the price change in round 3 based on their private information, and hedge against interdealer trades. Their total demand in round 2 is
where E T i2,t |Ω D i2,t is hedging against the expected trade dealer i receives from other dealers in round 2, D i2,t is dealer i's speculative demand as a function of private information c i1,t , and c i1,t is inventory control after the customer trade. Expected trade received from other dealers is zero in equilibrium (c i1,t has expectation zero conditioned on public information only, and the elements of c i1,t are IID). Dealers learn about the overall portfolio shifts through the aggregate order flow, x t = N i T i2,t , that they observe after the 5 This assumption seems to be too strong given the data set, and I will return to this in section 4.
interdealer trading in round 2. In the interbank market dealers receive signals of aggregate order flow through brokers.
In round 3, all dealers once more trade with the public to get rid of the rest of their inventory risk. The initial portfolio shift has price effects (i) because the public must be compensated for taking the risk (assuming the shift is sufficiently large to matter), and (ii) because of the potential signal of future return when the initial trading c i1,t is correlated with future return. The dealers are willing to compensate the public for taking the risk, instead of bearing the risk themselves, because the public has a greater capacity of bearing risk. In addition, the dealers have overnight limits on their inventory. Public trading in round three is the result of optimization.
All agents, both dealers and the public, have identical negative exponential utility defined over terminal wealth. Since all shocks are IID and expected wealth in the infinite horizon equals present wealth, each period can be analyzed in isolation, and thus maximizing end-of-period wealth will also maximize the utility. Therefore, the utility that will be maximized is given by
where W i3,t is end-of-period wealth in period t, and θ is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion.
Equilibrium
For the derivation of the specific equilibrium, I refer the reader to the appendix. The equilibrium shares the same structure, notwithstanding if c i1,t is correlated with future fundamental return or not. The equilibrium prices are
where x t is aggregate order flow 6 in the inter dealer trading in round 2, and λ a parameter that will be determined below. In round 1, all information is public when prices are set; hence all dealers set the same prices only adding the increment to currency value that was not included in the price already, represented by r t − πx t−1 . Equilibrium (no-arbitrage), and full transparency of prices, ensures that all dealers also set the same price in round 2. If the prices in round 2 are to be equal, these can only be conditioned on public information, and therefore the round 2 price must equal the round 1 price. Setting a price different from the others would reveal information and attract all supply/demand. Instead, dealers utilize their private information in forming their speculative demand in round 2. 7 Interdealer trade is only observed by the parts participating in the transaction. Equilibrium trade by dealer i is given by
where the second equality follows from the dealers' optimal speculative demand, derived in the appendix, and α is a constant in the dealers' trading strategy. The important issue is the price in round 3. In round 3, dealers trade with the public to reduce their inventory and thereby share the risk with the public. This is normal in foreign exchange markets, where dealers usually go home with a zero position. Dealers know that the total supply the public must absorb equals the negative of the sum of the portfolio shifts in round 1, − N i c i1,t . Given the trading strategy above, the order flow in round 2,
Hence, the dealers must quote a price P 3,t such that
where the second equality is the public demand from maximizing their utility, Ω P 3,t is the information set of the public, and γ equals θV ar P 3,t+1 |Ω P 3,t −1 . Solving for P 3,t gives
In addition to their expectations, the public must be compensated for bearing the additional risk, so the risk premium is given by ρx t .
Inserting for the expectation in (7), we get
where π = φ/α and φ is the parameter on new information in the public's conditional expectation (φ ∈ (0, 1)). The price in round 3 equals the expected fundamental value for the next period (F t + πx t ) plus the accumulated risk premium related to the accumulated risk the public have absorbed (
. From (4) and (8), the change in price equals the adjusted increment, an element for the expected return in the next period, and the additional compensation for taking additional risk:
If round 1 public trading is uncorrelated with future return, the two terms in the middle disappear, ∆P 3,t = r t + ρx t .
This is the equation tested by Evans and Lyons. By rewriting (10), it can empirically coincide with the above equation. To see this, insert for x t−1 . After observing r t , the noise from the flow in the previous period can be aggregated,
where I use (1) to insert for c i1,t−1 . Inserting this in equation (10) gives
whereη t = i φη it−1 . This term is uncorrelated with r t by definition. It is uncorrelatd with x t since x t = α i c i1,t , which are all IID. Therefore, r t and x t are weakly exogenous with respect to (1 − N φ) and λ. The termη t is unobservable for the econometrician, and will hence be captured by the error term in the econometric implementation. An example may clarify the model: For simplicity, imagine that all dealers are initially holding their preferred inventory of currency. In round 1, dealer 1 receives a buy order from a customer of 100 units of currency (c 11,t = 100). Dealer 1 is now short compared to his preferred position, and in round 2 he wants to cover the position. In addition, he speculates that there will be a buying pressure later on in round 3, and buys 120 (α = 1.2) in round 2 from the rest of the interbank market ("dealer 2"). Market order flow, x t , is 120. Dealer 2 wants to become square in trading with the public in round 3, and hence wishes to buy 120 from the customers. Dealer 1, having a speculative position of 20, wants to sell 20. The net flow that the public must absorb is −100 (= −c 11,t = −x t /1.2), so they must be induced to sell 100. The public, holding their preferred inventory, must be compensated to carry the risk of holding 100 units of currency less. The price is bid up by λ · 120, so that the public is willing to sell. Dealers accept this because it is less than what other dealers would have charged for taking the risk, since the public as a group has a greater capacity for bearing risk.
Data
The public information set consists of weekly observations on the interest rates for the six countries USA, Germany, Japan, Great Britain, Canada and Switzerland. In some regressions I will also use stock market indexes from the five countries. Figure 2 plots the interest rate differential between the U.S interest rate and the JPY, CHF, DEM, CAD and GBP interest rates, in that sequence from above.
The exchange rates are quoted at the end of the week. If there is no observation available at the Friday, I use the observations from the following Monday. Exchange rates are the USD against the DEM, the JPY, the GBP, the CAD and the CHF. These six currencies are among the seven most traded currencies globally (the French franc is no. 6, before the CAD). Similarly, the five exchange rates are among the six most traded exchange rates (BIS, 1998) . Figure 3 plots the five exchange rates. We see that the USD depreciated against the DEM, JPY, GBP and CHF in the fall of 1998, during the Asian crises. Also, notice that the DEM and the CHF are highly correlated. Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics for the four exchange rates from the beginning of July 1995 until September 1999. The GBP/USD and the CAD/USD are the two most stable exchange rates, with standard deviation being 3% and 5% of the mean, respectively. Standard deviation as percentage of mean is ca. 9 − 10% for the others. 
Currency flows
The order flow in the theoretical model is represented by weekly observations on currency trading in Deutsche mark (DEM), Japanese yen (JPY), British pound sterling (GBP), Canadian dollar (CAD) and Swiss franc (CHF) by large market participants in the U.S. The observations on currency trading are collected by the U.S. Treasury. The Treasury began publishing these weekly time series in the quarterly Treasury Bulletin in September 1994, with observations beginning in January 1994. In this study, I use observations from the beginning of July 1995 until the end of September 1999, which makes a total of 222 weeks. 8 The series include the weekly net positions of currency options, and the weekly sale and purchase of spot, forwards and futures together, by the major foreign exchange market participants in the U.S. All series are measured in the foreign currency, so DEM purchases are purchases of DEM by the major U.S. participants. The net option positions are measured as delta equivalent values. The delta equivalent equals the product of the first derivative of the option value with respect to the exchange rate, and the notional principal of the contract. The value of a call option (right to buy currency) is increasing in the price of the underlying currency. Hence, if a bank is long in call-options, they will have a positive net option position. If a bank is equally long in similar put and call options, the net position will be zero.
A major foreign exchange participant is one with more than $50 billion equivalent in foreign exchange contracts on the last business day of any quarter during the previous year (see Wei and Kim, 1997 ). There were 36 major participants in 1996 according to this definition, whereof 29 were commercial banks (Wei and Kim, 1997) . In 1995, 20 banks covered 70% of the activity in the U.S, while in 1998 24 banks covered 75% of the activity, according to BIS (1998 BIS ( , 1996 . Figure 4 plot the weekly trading activity, with one row for each currency. In the left column, there are net purchases of currency, while the right column shows currency purchases on the left axis, and net cumulative purchases at the right axis. All flow variables are measured in millions of the foreign currency, except JPY flows which are measured in billions JPY. In the cumulative graphs, I have set the initial point to zero since I have no observations on initial positions. The Purchase and Net Purchase series includes spot, forwards and futures. These series contain trading with all counterparties, meaning it is not only interbank trading. The banks will report both the sales to customers and the subsequent interbank trading to cover the customer transaction. From the graphs, it is clear that the net position taking of the banks in each week is very small. However, the cumulative grahs show that the position taking over time may be substantial. This problem is addressed in section 4. Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests show that all of the flow variables have unit roots, except the Net Options Position of CAD and CHF.
The theoretical model gives special attention to the sign of the trade, i.e. whether the initiator of the trade bought or sold currency. The reason is that a sale of currency by the initiating part may be taken as a signal that the currency is overvalued. Only knowing that one of the parts in a transaction sold currency is not enough information.
In the data set in this study there is no information about the sign, and in the regressions I will include the observations as they are. The following conditional prediction can be made: If the U.S. banks are the main market makers in these currencies, then a net (unexpected) sale of the foreign currency should lead to an appreciation of the exchange rate, i.e. increase the value of the currency. In the data, a net sale by the U.S. banks would in this case mean that most of the initiators bought currency. The reason might be that the initiators believed the currency to be undervalued, or that they needed currency and US banks charged a compensation for the risk they took when they provided the currency demanded. If, on the other hand, the U.S banks do not engage very much in market making, then it would mean that they are the ones that take initiative to trades. Then a net sale of foreign currency should lead a depreciation of the currency. What can be said about this issue? Since the U.S. market is the only active major market during most of the trading-day in the U.S., the major players involved in this data set are also the major players of the global market during U.S. daytime. These banks are then probably also the main market makers. On the other hand, since the European market is the largest currency market, U.S. banks tend to try to do most of their trading between 8 and 11 in the morning, while the European market still is active. With this in mind, there is no particular reason to believe that the U.S. banks mainly do market making. In the European market, most banks both serve as market makers and trade at other quotes. The exception being banks in London, which has a word for doing more market making than others do. Furthermore, the fact that the US banks in this data set take positions over the week indicate that they are aggressors. They will only take on these positions if they want to do so.
Results
The model is tested on the weekly frequency. While initial work by Evans and Lyons (1999) were on daily frequency, the testable implications is equally applicable at the weekly frequency as the daily. In the third round of the model, the dealers trade with the public to share risk. Within a week, it is likely that dealers share the risk by trading with each other in different time zones, since the foreign exchange market is a 24-hour open market. When the Europe market is closing, European dealers trade with US dealers to get rid of the inventory risk. Trading with the public to share risk may be a more important alternative at the end of week, since most regional markets are less active during weekends. Finally, if the effect from order flow is permanent it should matter at the weekly horizon as well.
If one believes that the periods in the model should be strictly interpreted as days, I can still test the model with weekly data on order flow. My approach would be equivalent to taking the 7th-difference in price as the dependent variable instead of the first difference, using the 7 day cumulative sum of order flow as a regressor, and testing the equation by only choosing end of week observations.
The theoretical model puts few restrictions on which public information variables to include in r t , and in which form. I follow Evans and Lyons and use change in the interest differential, ∆ i USD t − i * t with an * indicating the foreign interest rate. This is line with e.g. the monetary approach.
It is important to note that only unexpected order flows should influence the price, as the expected order flow should already be captured in the price. In the model, all order flow is unexpected, but this will not be the case in reality. I will test two versions of the theoretical model. In the first, I estimate the expected flow with an ARIMAX-model, 9 while in the second I use the flow from the previous week as a proxy for the expected flow. The two formulations are,
and
All regressions use the change in the log of nominal exchange rates for DEM/USD, JPY/USD, GBP/USD, CAD/USD and CHF/USD as dependent variable. Using the change in levels, as in the theoretical model, instead of change in logs does not affect the results. Results are shown in table 3 to 7. Estimated by GMM. t-values are in parenthesis, and ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%-level respectively. The net unexpected flow of spot sale equals "Spot sale− Spot sale − (Spot purchase− Spot purchase)", where Spot sale is the expected value from a ARIMA regression on past values of the flow variables. The other unexpected flow variables are defined in similar way. All flow coefficients multiplied by 10 3 . This means that the coefficients measure the effect of a 1 billion flow, except for JPY/USD where the coefficient measure the effect of a 1 trillion flow.
From table 3 we get the general picture from all the regressions. Net unexpected spot sale of foreign currency is significant and positive for DEM/USD, GBP/USD and CHF/USD, while Unexpected Options positions is significant for JPY/USD as well as for the exchange rates already mentioned. The coefficients on both flow variables are measured as the effect of a 1 billion flow. The coefficients on Net Unexpected Spot sale are positive. Since the flow variables are measured in the foreign currency, this means that an unexpected net sale of DEM, CHF or GBP by the major U.S. banks (i.e. an unexpected purchase of USD) appreciates the USD against the currency in question. The model would predict that the foreign currency should depreciate when the U.S. banks take the initiative to trade and sell currency. In this perspective, the U.S. banks rather trade at other banks quotes than to act as market makers. This can only be part of an equilibrium if somebody else is being market makers. If the U.S. banks do most of their trading while the European market is active, this might very well be the case.
The coefficient on the unexpected sale in the DEM/USD regression is 0.0005, which means that a unexpected sale pressure of 1 billion DEM increases the DEM/USD exchange rate with 0.05%. This is economically significant since the weekly change in DEM/USD is about 0.1%. The average absolute value of the net unexpected sale flow is 4 billion DEM.
The effect from increased options positions are negative and significant for DEM/USD, JPY/USD, GBP/USD and CHF/USD. If the U.S. banks unexpectedly increase their positions of call options (rights to buy currency), this is signal that they expect the currency to be more valuable than the current price/strike price. This will then subsequently lead to an appreciation of the currency. The effect is analogous to a unexpected spot purchase pressure for the currency.
In table 9 and 10 in the appendix we run the regression without the option variables. The unexpected spot flow remains significant, and the coefficients are only slightly less in value. Estimated by GMM. t-values are in parenthesis, and ***, ** and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%-level respectively. The net unexpected flow of spot sale equals "Spot sale− Spot sale − (Spot purchase− Spot purchase)", where Spot sale is the expected value from a ARIMA regression on past values of the flow variables. The other unexpected flow variables are defined in similar way. All flow coefficients multiplied by 10 3 . This means that the coefficients measure the effect of a 1 billion flow, except for JPY/USD where the coefficient measure the effect of a 1 trillion flow.
In table 4 I also include two stock indexes in each regression as well. The Standard & Poor 500 is included in all regressions, while the other indexes; the Frankfurt-index (Commerzbank) from Germany; the Nikkei 225 index from Tokyo, Japan; the FT-SE 100 from London, UK; the Toronto TSE-300 from Canada; and the SPI General Index from Zurich, Switzerland, are only included in their respective regressions. The stock indexes are included to see if the flow variables remain significant even when more public information that may be related to exchange rate return are included in the regressions. The table shows that the flow still is significant, although only at the 10% level for the DEM/USD. From the table we see that it is primarily the foreign stock index return that have explanatory power for the exchange rates, and that the coefficients have different signs. The effect is positive for the DEM/USD, GBP/USD and the CHF/USD, while it is negative for CAD/USD. One can also notice that the coefficient on the flow decrease somewhat compared to the previous table. This, together with the positive coefficient on the foreign stock exchange, suggest the following explanation. When the foreign stock exchange increases US investors rebalance their portfoilio and sell some foreign currency, making the foreign currency less worth and picking up some of the effect from the flow.
Changes in interest differentials have negative and significant coefficients for CAD/USD and CHF/USD, and positive for GBP/USD. The negative coefficients are a bit counterintuitive. When the US interest rate increase relative to the foreign interest rate, the USD depreciates (the exchange rate decreases, so the foreign currency appreciates). From figure 2 and 3 we see that the USD has appreciated against the CHF and CAD over the sample, and at the same time the interest differential has remained stable (CHF) or fallen (CAD). Hence, it may be that the negative coefficient is due to long term trends not captured here. The lack of significance for the two other exchange rates may be due to that interest differentials are not very good indicators of new information since many interest changes are anticipated by the market.
In this paper the main focus is on the flow variables, and as the tables in the appendix show, the coefficients of the flow variables are not affected by using the lagged change in interest differentials as an instrument. Estimated by GMM. t-values are in parenthesis, and ***, ** and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%-level respectively. The net unexpected flow of spot sale equals "Spot sale− Spot sale − (Spot purchase− Spot purchase)", where Spot sale is the expected value from a ARIMA regression on past values of the flow variables. The other unexpected flow variables are defined in similar way. All flow coefficients multiplied by 10 3 . This means that the coefficients measure the effect of a 1 billion flow, except for JPY/USD where the coefficient measure the effect of a 1 trillion flow.
In the regressions in table 3 and 4 the flow variables have a permanent effect on exchange rates, in line with the presumption that they aggregate new information. This can however be tested, which is done in table 5. If the flow variables do not provide new information, the effect should not be permanent. The effect could then either be countered or disappear when lagged flows are included in the regressions. For the DEM/USD, GBP/USD and CHF/USD, the exchange rates with significant coefficients on the flow variables above, the lagged flow is insignificant while the current flows remain significant and with the same value on the coefficients. In case of JPY/USD, the current flow is insignificant, as before, but the lagged flow is significant. Estimated by GMM. t-values are in parenthesis, and ***, ** and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%-level respectively. All flow coefficients multiplied by 10 3 . This means that the coefficients measure the effect of a 1 billion flow, except for JPY/USD where the coefficient measure the effect of a 1 trillion flow. Estimated by GMM. t-values are in parenthesis, and ***, ** and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%-level respectively. All flow coefficients multiplied by 10 3 . This means that the coefficients measure the effect of a 1 billion flow, except for JPY/USD where the coefficient measure the effect of a 1 trillion flow.
In table 6 and 7, I test the model with unexpected flow proxied by the change in the flow variables. I also include the sale of currency and purchase of currency as separate variables, instead of the net of the two, to see if they have different coefficients. This is also done in table 10 to 13 in the appendix, there with estimated expected flow as previous. First we see that the flow variables enter significantly for the same exchange rate as above, and with similar absolute values on the coefficients as before. The coefficients on sale and purchase are also of opposite sign, as expected. Therefore, the results do not seem to be very sensitive to the formulation of the unexpected flow. Second, there seems to be no asymmetric response to the flow. The coefficients on the sale and purchase look very similar, which they also are in case of DEM/USD. For GBP/USD and CHF/USD however, it depends on which regression we use to test the coefficients. In the regression in table 6, the coefficients for CHF/USD are insignificantly different, while they are significantly different at the 10% level in case of GBP/USD using a Wald test.
The flow variables in the data set contains all the trading of the banks, while the order flow in the model only comes from interbank trading. This creates a problem. In the model, dealer i close his position at the end of the period so his total trading sum to zero. In the data, an unexpected net purchase flow of currency means that the U.S. banks are unexpectedly taking positions (building inventory). Although position taking may be reasonable if the banks receive private fundamental information, building position taking into the model is very difficult The problem is that the dealer then needs to take account of his inventory when entering a period. This can result in very complicated trading strategies. Trading strategies as simple functions of customer trades, as in the model, can be obtained by assuming that all customer trades are of fixed absolute size. However, this makes the parameter in the trading strategy time-dependent because it will depend on the inventory, and hence not very useful for empirical analysis.
A possible interpretation of the results, in the spirit of the model, is the following: When customers buy currency it provides a signal to the bank that the exchange rate will appreciate due to fundamental reasons. The bank take the same position as the customers, and are willing to hold this position because it is based on fundamental information. If the bank only speculated on the risk premium however, they should not, at least in a finite horizon framework, take a position because they know that in the end it is the fundamentals that determine the exchange rates.
It is important for the interpretation of order flow as valuable information that the effect from unexpected flow is permanent. In that case we also have a relationship between the level of the exchange rate and the cumulative unexpected flow, i.e. the exchange rate and the cumulative flow cointegrate. This is evident in the theoretical model from equation (9). In figure 5 the level of the exchange rates is plotted on the left axes, while cumulative unexpected sales of foreign currency is plotted on the right axes. The figure shows the three exchange rates where I find significant relationship between the change in the exchange rate and the flow of unexpected sales. The cumulative unexpected sale is calculated as the cumulative sum of the net unexpected sale from table 3.
From the figure it seems that the series cointegrate, and the cointegrating relationsships are shown in table 8 together with unit root test statistics.
The coefficients are multiplied with 10 3 , so they measures the effect of the cumulative sum of unexpected sales of 1 billion foreign currency. The coefficients are reported with t-values in parenthesis. Since the variables have unit roots we do not report significance levels. The trend is included to capture latent variables (Engle and Yoo, 1991) . The cointegration result confirm the results from above. The cumulative sum of unexpected net sales of currency goes together with a weaker exchange rates. The graphs show the level of the exchange rates on the left axis, and the level of the cumulative unexpected spot sale of currency on the right axis. The parameters are estimated using ordinary least square. t-values are reported in parenthesis. Since the variables have one unit root, we do not report significance levels. The dependent variable is price. Cumulative flow is created from the cumulative flow of net unexpected spot sales. ADF-test is a standard augmented Dickey-Fuller test on the regression residual. PP-test is a Phillips-Perron test (Perron, 1988) on the regression residual. The Phillips-Perron test incorporates the Newey and West (1987) modification procedure. The number of lags included is calculated from the sample size (Newey-West automatic truncation lag selection). The tests do not include a trend since a trend is included in the original regression equation. "***", "**" and "*" indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. All flow coefficients multiplied by 10 3 . This means that the coefficients measure the effect of a 1 billion flow.
Conclusion
Since the float of the major currencies in the 1970s, there have been enormous amounts of empirical research on exchange rates. This has provided us with insights on exchange rate behavior in the longer run. However, our knowledge of the functioning of the market at shorter horizons is still limited. Most research has been within the asset approach to foreign exchange. However, questionnaire surveys from the market indicate that assumptions like perfect information and homogenous agents that underlie the asset approach and other macroeconomic models of exchange rate determination are too restrictive. In the theory of market microstructure, these assumptions are relaxed. One consequence is that order flow may be informative about exchange rate movements. Recently several papers have shown that order flow influences exchange rates, in contrast with the traditional macroeconomic models. This is important because trading activities obviously are an important characteristic of the foreign exchange market, and therefore should be part of theoretical models. The importance of order flow for exchange rate determination is also stressed by market participants.
In this paper I test a macroeconomic model where order flow is informative due to private information. The model is tested on four years of weekly data for U.S. exchange rates and currency flows. The exchange rates studied, the DEM/USD, JPY/USD, GBP/USD, CAD/USD and CHF/USD, are the most traded exchange rates globally. The weekly horizon is sufficiently long for fundamental macroeconomic variables having effect, while still much shorter than what one has been able to explain earlier. The weekly horizon is also short enough to potentially allow for private information.
For three of the exchange rates, the DEM/USD, GBP/USD and CHF/USD, the trading activities by major players in the U.S. market have a both economically and statistically significant effect on exchange rates. The results are robust to several formulations, both to what may constitute public macroeconomic information, and to how we should measure unexpected currency flows.
When U.S. banks buy currency, or rights to buy currency (call options), the currency appreciates. This is consistent with the view that U.S. banks do most of their trading while the European market still is active (8 am -11 am) , and that they during this trading primarily trade at other banks' quotes.
As an extra confirmation on the relationship between exchange rates and the order flow, I find that the level of the exchange rates and their respective cumulative order flow are positively cointegrated. The order flow has an permanent effect on the exchange rates.
The results confirm earlier results on the importance of order flow from intraday analysis (Payne, 1999; Evans, 1999) , daily exchange rates (Evans and Lyons, 1999 ) and weekly exchange rates (Rime, 2000) . That the order flows have effect even on the weekly horizon may be surprising, and indicate that microstructure and order flow analysis are to be considered also on longer horizons than the usual intraday. This may have implications for monetary policy actions in the foreign exchange market, but this remains a topic for future research. Estimated by GMM. t-values are in parenthesis, and ***, ** and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%-level respectively. The unexpected flow of spot sale equals "Spot sale− Spot sale", where Spot sale is the expected value from a ARIMA regression on past values of the flow variables. The other unexpected flow variables are defined in similar way. All flow coefficients multiplied by 10 3 . This means that the coefficients measure the effect of a 1 billion flow, except for JPY/USD where the coefficient measure the effect of a 1 trillion flow. Estimated by GMM. t-values are in parenthesis, and ***, ** and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%-level respectively. The unexpected flow of spot sale equals "Spot sale− Spot sale", where Spot sale is the expected value from a ARIMA regression on past values of the flow variables. The other unexpected flow variables are defined in similar way. All flow coefficients multiplied by 10 3 . This means that the coefficients measure the effect of a 1 billion flow, except for JPY/USD where the coefficient measure the effect of a 1 trillion flow. Estimated by GMM. t-values are in parenthesis, and ***, ** and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%-level respectively. The unexpected flow of spot sale equals "Spot sale− Spot sale", where Spot sale is the expected value from a ARIMA regression on past values of the flow variables. The other unexpected flow variables are defined in similar way. All flow coefficients multiplied by 10 3 . This means that the coefficients measure the effect of a 1 billion flow, except for JPY/USD where the coefficient measure the effect of a 1 trillion flow. Estimated by GMM. t-values are in parenthesis, and ***, ** and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%-level respectively. The unexpected flow of spot sale equals "Spot sale− Spot sale", where Spot sale is the expected value from a ARIMA regression on past values of the flow variables. The other unexpected flow variables are defined in similar way. All flow coefficients multiplied by 10 3 . This means that the coefficients measure the effect of a 1 billion flow, except for JPY/USD where the coefficient measure the effect of a 1 trillion flow. Estimated by GMM. t-values are in parenthesis, and ***, ** and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%-level respectively. The unexpected flow of spot sale equals "Spot sale− Spot sale", where Spot sale is the expected value from a ARIMA regression on past values of the flow variables. The other unexpected flow variables are defined in similar way. All flow coefficients multiplied by 10 3 . This means that the coefficients measure the effect of a 1 billion flow, except for JPY/USD where the coefficient measure the effect of a 1 trillion flow.
A Tables

B Model solution
Each dealer chooses quotes and trading strategy by maximizing a negative exponential utility function defined over expected nominal terminal wealth. 10 The public decide on their round 3 demand by maximizing an identical utility function. The horizon is infinite. However, because returns are independent across periods, with an unchanging stochastic structure, the problem collapses into a series of independent trading problems, one for each period. Since all shocks are normally distributed, the conditional variances in each period do not depend on the realization of the shock and is constant across periods.
I choose the infinite horizon to circumvent the problem of accounting for the time left before the terminal period, which arises in a model with a finite horizon. In the final period, in a finite horizon model, the fundamental value will be revealed, and trading will only occur at this price. In the next-to-final period, everybody knows all elements of the fundamental value except the last; thus the final price should be associated with very little uncertainty. Yet, the price in this period might very well be different from the expected final period fundamental value, due to an accumulated risk premium. Hence, any risk premium in the next to final period should reflect this. The problem is that the solution in Evans and Lyons' model does allow this, since it does not take account of the remaining period of time. With an infinite horizon, each period will be equally far away from a "final" period, and we can use this trick to analyze each period in isolation. Notice that the expectation of wealth in the infinite horizon exactly equals wealth in the present period, and is thereby finite.
The problem solved by the dealers is the following: max {Pi1,t,Pi2,t,Pi3,t,Ti2,t} E − exp (−θW i3,t ) |Ω D iτ,t (B.1) subject to W i3,t = W i0,t + c i1t P i1t + T i2,t P i2 + I i2t P i3 − T i2t P i2t = W i0,t + c i1t (P i1t − P i2t ) + D i2,t + E T i2,t |Ω D i2,t (P i3t − P i2t ) (B.2) + T i2t (P i3t − P i2t ) .
Initial wealth in period t is given by W i0,t . P iτ,t denotes dealer i's quote in round τ of period t, T i2,t is dealer i's trading in round 2 of period t, and denotes a quote or trade received from other dealers by dealer i. Dealer i's inventory of currency after trading in round τ is given by I iτ,t . The outgoing interdealer trade of dealer i in round 2 can be divided into three components:
where D i2,t is speculative demand, inventory after trading in round 1 is −c i1,t , and E T i2t |Ω D i2t is a hedge against incoming orders from other dealers. In equilibrium, this expectation equals zero, since E [c i1,t |Ω 1t ] = E [r t+1 + η it |Ω 1t ] = 0 and c i1,t is IID.
The information sets are as follows, where superscript D and superscript P mean dealer and public respectively: 
B.1 Equilibrium prices
Equilibrium prices are given by P 1,t = P 3,t−1 + r t − πx t−1 = P 2t , ∀i (B.4)
Observability of all prices and no-arbitrage require that all dealers give equal quotes in each round. For the quotes to be equal, they can only be conditioned on public information. Equilibrium prices are then pinned down by demand and supply:
E [c i1,t + D i2,t (P 1,t ) |Ω 1,t ] = 0 (B.6)
[c i1,t + D i2,t (P 2,t )] |Ω 1,t = 0 (B.7)
c i1,t + c 3,t (P 3,t ) |Ω Round 1 price P 1t ensures that the public willingly hold all the currency they held at the end of the previous period, and that dealers are willing to absorb their trading, i.e. in expectation of there being zero net-supply from the public. Since P 3,t−1 contains an expectation about r t , we need to adjust for this part when the market observes the realization of r t ; hence we extract πx t−1 from r t . The price in round 2 can only be conditioned on public information and must therefore equal the price in round 1. From T4, dealers must end each period with zero inventory and the round 3 price must satisfy
The conjectured trading strategy of dealers equal T i2,t = αc i1,t . (B.10)
We can now write the sum on the right-hand-side of (B.9) in terms of observed interbank order flow: Customers' optimal demand follows c 3t = γ E P 3,t+1 |Ω P 3,t − P 3t = − 1 α x t , where γ −1 = θvar P 3,t+1 |Ω P 3,t and the second equality comes from the amount the dealers want the public to absorb. The market-clearing price in round 3 then becomes P 3t = E P 3,t+1 |Ω P 3,t + 1 γα x t .
Since the flow is informative about the increment in the next period, this will be part of the expectation. The round 3 price becomes P 3t = P 2,t + π + 1 γα x t = P 2t + λx t , where π = φ/α and φ = σ 2 r / σ 2 r + σ 2 c is the updating parameter. The price in round 3 equals the price in round 2, which induces the public to maintain their inventory, and adds an information adjustment element and a new risk premium. By subsequently inserting for lagged price, we get P 3,t = t =1 r + 1 γα x + πx t = F t + 1 γα t =1
x + πx t .
The price in round 3 contains all public information up to period t and the necessary risk premium for the public to hold the currency from previous periods. In addition, they infer information about the increment in the next period from the flow and update their beliefs accordingly. Finally, they demand a risk compensation to absorb the new additional flow. The testable equation is ∆P 3,t = r t + πx t−1 + πx t + ρx t , ρ = 1/γα, π = φ/α. (B.12)
The first two terms are related to the new information in public news, the third is a signal on the return of the next period, while the last term picks up the new risk premium.
B.2 Trading strategy
The trading strategy is given by T i2,t = αc i1t . (B.13)
The problem the dealers must solve is the following: max Di2,t E − exp (−θW i3,t ) |Ω D i2,t , subject to W i3,t = W i0,t + c i1t (P i1t − P i2t ) + D i2,t + E T i2,t |Ω D i2,t
This utility function has the convenient property of maximizing its expectation, when variables are normally distributed, i.e. that W ∼ N µ, σ 2 , is equivalent to maximizing 
The first-order condition is 2λD i2t + c i1t − θσ 2 D i2t = 0, (B.14)
which implies a speculative demand of
Trading then becomes
15)
The second-order condition, 2λ − θσ 2 < 0 ⇒ θσ 2 − 2λ > 0, (B.16) ensures that α > 1.
